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During the last few years a number of authors have argued that free cap-
ital mobility produces macroeconomic instability and contributes to ﬁ-
nancial vulnerability in the emerging nations. For example, in his critique
of the U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Stiglitz
(2002) has argued that pressuring emerging and transition countries to re-
lax controls on capital mobility during the 1990s was a huge mistake. Ac-
cording to him, the easing of controls on capital mobility was at the center
of most (if not all) currency crises in the emerging markets during the last
decade—Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999,
Turkey in 2001, and Argentina in 2002. These days, even the IMF seems to
criticize free capital mobility and to provide (at least some) support for
capital controls. Indeed, on a visit to Malaysia in September 2003 Horst
Koehler, then the IMF’s managing director, praised the policies of Prime
Minister Mahathir, and in particular his use of capital controls in the after-
math of the 1997 currency crisis (Beattie 2003).
Supporters of capital controls have argued that restricting capital mo-
bility has two important potential beneﬁts: (a) it reduces a country’s vul-
nerability to external shocks and ﬁnancial crises; and (b) it allows countries
that have suﬀered a currency crisis to lower interest rates, implement pro-
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ments.growth policies, and emerge from the crisis sooner than they would have
otherwise. According to this view, controlling capital outﬂows would give
crisis countries additional time to restructure their ﬁnancial sector in an
orderly fashion.1
The evidence in support of these claims, however, has been mostly coun-
try speciﬁc, and not particularly convincing. Some authors have claimed
that by restricting capital mobility Chile was able to avoid the type of
macroeconomic turmoil that aﬀected the rest of Latin America during the
1990s (Stiglitz 1999).2 Also, it has been argued that Malaysia’s imposition
of controls on capital outﬂows in the aftermath of the Asian debt crisis
helped the country rebound quickly and resume a growth path (Kaplan
and Rodrik 2002). According to other authors, however, the experiences of
both Chile and Malaysia with capital controls have been mixed at best
(Dornbusch 2002; Johnson and Mitton 2001; De Gregorio, Edwards, and
Valdes 2000). What is particularly interesting about this debate is that af-
ter many years it continues to be centered mostly on the experiences of a
handful of countries, and that much of it has taken place at an anecdotal
level. There have been very few studies that have provided multicountry ev-
idence on whether capital controls indeed reduce vulnerability or reduce
the costs of crises.3 This paucity of multicountry studies is partially ex-
plained by the diﬃculties in measuring the degree of capital mobility
across time and countries (Eichengreen 2001).
In this paper I use a broad multicountry data set to analyze the relation-
ship between restrictions to capital mobility and external crises. The anal-
ysis focuses on two manifestations of external crises that have received con-
siderable attention during the last few years: (a) sudden stops of capital
inﬂows, and (b) current account reversals.4 I am particularly interested in
dealing with the following two speciﬁc questions:
• Do capital controls reduce the probability of a major external crisis
(deﬁned as a sudden stop or a current account reversal)?
• And, once a crisis has occurred, do countries that restrict capital mo-
bility incur in lower costs—measured by reductions in growth—than
countries that have a more open capital account?
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1. Most well-trained economists would agree that there are trade-oﬀs associated with the
imposition of capital controls. Whether the costs oﬀset the beneﬁts is a complex empirical
question, whose answer will depend on the speciﬁcities of each particular country. Doing a
full-blown cost-beneﬁt analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, however.
2. See, however, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000). Some authors have also argued
that the absence of crises in India and China is an indication of the merits of controlling cap-
ital mobility. It is diﬃcult, however, to take these claims seriously.
3. There have been, however, a number of cross-country studies that have tried to determine
whether capital controls have an eﬀect on economic growth. For a survey, see Eichengreen
(2001).
4. For a discussion of these two phenomena see, for example, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía
(2004) and Edwards (2004b).In analyzing these issues I rely on two complementary approaches. First,
I use a methodology based on the computation of nonparametric tests and
frequency tables to analyze the incidence and main characteristics of both
sudden stops and current account reversals in countries with diﬀerent de-
grees of capital controls. And second, I use a regression-based analysis that
estimates jointly the probability of having a crisis, and the cost of such cri-
sis, in terms of short-term declines in output growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 I provide a se-
lected survey of recent eﬀorts to measure the degree of capital mobility. I
review various indexes, and I discuss their strengths and weaknesses. In
section 2.3 I deal with the evolution of capital account restrictions during
the last thirty years. The section opens with an analysis of the evolution of
capital account openness based on a new index, which I have constructed
by combining three data sources: (a) the index developed by Quinn (2003);
(b) the index by Mody and Murshid (2002); and (c) country-speciﬁc infor-
mation obtained from various sources, including country-speciﬁc sources.
Section 2.4 deals with the anatomy of sudden stops and current account re-
versals. I analyze their incidence and the extent to which these two phe-
nomena are related. This analysis is performed for three groups of coun-
tries classiﬁed according to the degree of capital mobility: Low capital
mobility, Intermediate capital mobility, and High capital mobility coun-
tries. My main interest in this analysis is to compare the two extreme
groups: Low and High capital mobility. In section 2.5 I report new results
on the costs of external crises characterized by sudden stops and/or current
account reversals. I am particularly interested in determining if the cost of
a crisis—measured in terms of lower growth—is diﬀerent for countries
with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. I use treatment regressions to an-
alyze whether restricting capital mobility reduces vulnerability and the
costs of crises. Finally, in section 2.6 I provide some concluding remarks.
The paper also has a data appendix.
Before proceeding it is important to stress that in this paper I do not pro-
vide a full-ﬂedged cost-beneﬁt analysis of capital controls. I deal in detail
with two important aspects of the problem—capital controls and vulnera-
bility, and the growth consequences of crises under diﬀerent intensity of
controls—but I don’t cover all the consequences of control policies. In par-
ticular, I don’t deal with many microeconomic consequences and costs of a
policy of capital controls (see Forbes 2003 for this type of discussion).
2.2 Measuring the Degree of Openness of the Capital Account
Most analysts agree that during the last few decades there has been an
increase in the degree of international capital mobility. There is less agree-
ment, however, on the exact nature (and magnitude) of this phenomenon.
The reason for this is that it is very diﬃcult to measure in a relatively pre-
Capital Controls, Sudden Stops, and Current Account Reversals 75cise way a country’s degree of capital mobility. Indeed, with the exception
of the two extremes—absolute freedom or complete closeness of the capi-
tal account—it is not easy to provide eﬀective measures that capture the
extent of capital market integration. What has been particularly challeng-
ing has been constructing indexes that allow for useful comparisons across
countries and across time. In this section I review a number of attempts at
building indexes of capital mobility, and I propose a new measure that
combines information from two of the better indexes with country-speciﬁc
data. I then use this new index to analyze the evolution of capital account
restrictions during the last three decades.
Historically, most emerging and transition countries have relied heavily
on diﬀerent forms of capital account restrictions. While throughout most
of the post–World War II period these have been aimed at avoiding capital
“ﬂight,” more recently countries have tried to avoid (or at least slow down)
large inﬂows of capital (Edwards 1999). However, there has long been rec-
ognition that legal impediments on capital mobility are not always trans-
lated into actual restrictions on these movements. This distinction between
actual and legal capital mobility has been the subject of policy debates, in-
cluding the debate on the eﬀectiveness of capital controls.
There is ample historical evidence suggesting that there have been sig-
niﬁcant discrepancies between the legal and the actual degree of capital
controls. In countries with severe legal impediments to capital mobility—
including countries that have banned capital movement—the private sec-
tor has traditionally resorted to the overinvoicing of imports and under-
invoicing of exports to sidestep legal controls on capital ﬂows (Garber 1998
discusses more sophisticated mechanisms). For example, the massive vol-
umes of capital ﬂight that took place in Latin America in the wake of the
1982 debt crisis clearly showed that, when faced with the “appropriate” in-
centives, the public can be extremely creative in ﬁnding ways to move cap-
ital internationally. The question of how to measure, from an economic
point of view, the degree of capital mobility and the extent to which do-
mestic capital markets are integrated to the world capital market continues
to be the subject of extensive debate. (See Dooley, Mathieson, and Rojas-
Suarez 1997 for an early and comprehensive treatment of the subject. See
Eichengreen 2001 for a more recent discussion.)
In two early studies Harberger (1978, 1980) argued that the eﬀective de-
gree of integration of capital markets should be measured by the conver-
gence of private rates of return to capital across countries. In trying to mea-
sure the eﬀective degree of capital mobility, Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
analyzed the behavior of savings and investments in a number of countries.
They argue that if there is perfect capital mobility, changes in savings and
investments will be uncorrelated in a speciﬁc country. That is, in a world
without capital restrictions an increase in domestic savings will tend to
“leave the home country,” moving to the rest of the world. Likewise, if in-
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vestment will tend to be funded by the world at large and not necessarily
by domestic savings. Using a data set for sixteen Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Feldstein and
Horioka found that savings and investment ratios were highly positively
correlated, and concluded that these results strongly supported the pre-
sumption that long-term capital was subject to signiﬁcant impediments.
Frankel (1991) applied the Feldstein-Horioka test to a large number of
countries during the 1980s, including a number of Latin American nations.
His results corroborated those obtained by the original study, indicating
that savings and investment have been signiﬁcantly positively correlated in
most countries. In a comprehensive analysis of the degree of capital mo-
bility, Montiel (1994) estimated a series of Feldstein-Horioka equations for
sixty-two developing countries. Using the estimated regression coeﬃcient
for the industrial countries as a benchmark, he concluded that the major-
ity of the Latin American nations exhibited a relatively high degree of cap-
ital mobility—indeed, much larger than what an analysis of legal restric-
tions would suggest.
In a series of studies Edwards (1985) and Edwards and Khan (1985) ar-
gued that degree of convergence of domestic and international interest
rates could be used to assess the degree of openness of the capital account
(see also Montiel 1994). The application of this model to the cases of a
number of countries (Brazil, Colombia, Chile) conﬁrms the results that, in
general, the actual degree of capital mobility is greater than what the legal
restrictions approach suggests. Haque and Montiel (1991), Reisen and
Yèches (1993), and Dooley (1995) have provided expansions of this model
that allow for the estimation of the degree of capital mobility even in cases
when there are not enough data on domestic interest rates, and when there
are changes in the degree of capital mobility through time. Their results
once again indicate that in most emerging countries true capital mobility
has historically exceeded the legal extent of capital mobility. Dooley,
Mathieson, and Rojas-Suarez (1997) developed a method for measuring
the changes in the degree of capital mobility in emerging countries that rec-
ognizes the costs of undertaking disguised capital inﬂows. The model is es-
timated using a Kalman ﬁlter technique for three countries. The results
suggest that all three countries experienced a very signiﬁcant increase in
the degree of capital mobility between 1977 and 1989. Edwards (2000) used
a “time-varying coeﬃcients” variant of this approach to analyze the way in
which Chile’s actual degree of capital mobility evolved through time.
Some authors have used information contained in the IMF’s Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to construct indexes on capital
controls for a panel of countries. Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti
(1994), for example, constructed a dummy variable index of capital con-
trols. This indicator—which takes a value of 1 when capital controls are in
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forces behind the imposition of capital restrictions in a score of countries.5
Rodrik (1998) used a similar index to investigate the eﬀects of capital con-
trols on growth, inﬂation, and investment between 1979 and 1989. His re-
sults suggest that, after controlling for other variables, capital restrictions
have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on macroeconomic performance. Klein and
Olivei (1999) used the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions data to construct an index of capital mobility. The index is de-
ﬁned as the number of years in the period 1986 and 1995 that, according to
the IMF, the country in question has had an open capital account.6In con-
trast to that of Rodrik, their analysis suggests that countries with a more
open capital account have performed better than those that restrict capital
mobility.7 Leblang (1997), Razin and Rose (1994), and Chinn and Ito
(2002) have also used indicators based on the IMF binary classiﬁcation of
openness. The standard approach is to use line E.2 of the annual summary
published in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. In an early attempt to use this IMF report, Edwards (1989)
used the detailed information in the individual country pages to analyze
the way in which restrictions on capital mobility changed in the period im-
mediately surrounding a major exchange rate crisis.
A major limitation of these IMF-based binary indexes, however, is that
they are extremely general and do not distinguish between diﬀerent inten-
sities of capital restrictions. Moreover, they fail to distinguish the type of
ﬂow that is being restricted, and they ignore the fact that, as discussed
above, legal restrictions are frequently circumvented. For example, ac-
cording to this IMF-based indicator, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil were sub-
ject to the same degree of capital controls in 1992–94. In reality, however,
the three cases were extremely diﬀerent. While in Chile there were restric-
tions on short-term inﬂows, Mexico had (for all practical purposes) free
capital mobility, and Brazil had in place an arcane array of restrictions.
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) have combined IMF and country-speciﬁc in-
formation to construct an index on the intensity of capital controls in ﬁf-
teen countries during 1990–96. Although their index, which can take three
values (0, 1, or 2) represents an improvement over straight IMF indicators,
it is still rather general, and does not capture the subtleties of actual capi-
tal restrictions. These measurement diﬃculties are not unique to the capi-
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5. Edison et al. (2002) provide a very useful summary (table 1 of their paper) of twelve diﬀer-
ent measures of capital account restrictions used in recent studies on the relationship between
capital controls and economic performance.
6. A limitation with this indicator is that it does not say if the index’s number (i.e., the per-
centage of years with restrictions) refers to most recent or most distant years in the time win-
dow being considered.
7. As Eichengreen (2001) points out, some authors supplement the information from the
IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions with information on the extent of
restrictions on current transactions. See also Frankel (1992).tal ﬂows literature, however. In fact, as Rodrik (1995) and Edwards (1998)
have argued, the literature on trade openness and growth has long been
aﬀected by serious measurement problems.
In an eﬀort to deal with these measurement problems, Quinn (1997) con-
structed a comprehensive set of cross-country indicators on the degree of
capital mobility. His indicators cover twenty advanced countries and forty-
ﬁve emerging economies. These indexes have two distinct advantages over
other indicators. First, they are not restricted to a binary classiﬁcation,
where countries’ capital accounts are either open or closed. Quinn uses a
0–4 scale to classify the countries in his sample, with a higher number
meaning a more open capital account. Second, the Quinn indexes cover
more than one time period, allowing researchers to investigate whether
there is a connection between capital account liberalization and economic
performance. This is, indeed, an improvement over traditional indexes that
have concentrated on a particular period in time, without allowing re-
searchers to analyze whether countries that open up to international capi-
tal movements have experienced changes in performance.8 In an interest-
ing exercise, Edison and Warnock (2003) compared Quinn’s (1997) index
with an index based on the number of years that, according to the Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, a country has had a
closed capital account. They found that for most (but not all) countries and
periods there was a correspondence between the two indicators.
Chinn and Ito (2002) built a new index based on the IMF binary data.
Their index is the average of the ﬁrst standardized principal component of
each of four categories of transactions considered by the IMF. Chinn and
Ito consider their index to be in the spirit of the work by Edwards (2001)
and Klein and Olivei (1999), and argue that, in contrast with the simple 
0–1 IMF-based indexes, theirs is able to capture the intensity of capital re-
strictions. An advantage of this index constructed by Chinn and Ito is that
it is available for 105 countries for the period 1977–97.
More recently, Quinn, Inclan, and Toyoda (2001) and Quinn (2003) used
detailed data obtained from the IMF to develop a new index of capital mo-
bility for ﬁfty-nine countries. This index goes from 1 to 100, with higher
values denoting a higher degree of ﬁnancial integration. Thus, countries
with stricter capital controls have a lower value of this index. For a small
number of these countries the index is available for the period 1950–99; for
most of them it is available for ﬁve years: 1959, 1973, 1982, 1988, and 1997.
And for a core number of countries the index is available since 1890 (for de-
tails see Quinn 2003). Mody and Murshid (2002) also used IMF data as the
bases for their index of ﬁnancial integration. This index covers 150 coun-
tries for (most of) the period 1966–2000, and is tabulated from a value of 0
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8. Note, however, that the basic information used by Quinn to construct this index also
comes from the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.to 4. This index takes the value of 0 in the case that a country has a closed
capital account, has a closed current account, places restrictions on their
exports receipts, and operates under multiple exchange rates. Both these
new indexes (Quinn and Mody-Murshid) represent a signiﬁcant improve-
ment over previous attempts at measuring the variation across time and
countries of capital restrictions.
In a recent paper Miniane (2004) has proposed a new measure based on
detailed country-speciﬁc data compiled by the IMF. Since 1996 the IMF’s
Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
has published a very detailed and disaggregated index of capital account
restrictions that distinguishes between thirteen diﬀerent categories. This
level of disaggregation is a marked improvement over the pre-1996 Annual
Report data, which considered only six categories—bilateral payment ar-
rangements, restrictions on current account transaction payments, re-
strictions on capital account, import surcharges, advanced deposits on
imports, and export proceeds surrendering. Miniane has extended the
more detailed thirteen-category index backward to 1983 for thirty-four
countries. He shows that this new measure is more accurate than the older,
less detailed one.
Although these new indexes on capital restrictions represent a major im-
provement with respect to earlier indicators, they still have some limita-
tions, including the fact that, in spite of the authors’ eﬀorts, the indexes do
not distinguish sharply between diﬀerent types of restrictions (i.e., controls
on foreign direct investment versus portfolio ﬂows; controls on inﬂows ver-
sus controls on outﬂows).9 Second, these indexes tend to blur the distinc-
tion between exchange restrictions—including the required surrendering
of exports’ proceeds—and capital account restrictions. Third, they do not
deal in a systematic way with the fact that many countries’ controls are
(partially) evaded. This means that an ideal index of capital account re-
strictions would make a correction for the eﬀectiveness of the controls (see
De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes 2000 for an attempt to deal with this is-
sue for the case of Chile).
Most of the indexes discussed above have tried to capture the overall de-
gree of capital mobility in particular countries at a particular moment in
time. A number of authors, however, have concentrated on the degree of
openness of the stock market. Most of these studies have tried to analyze
the eﬀect of the openingof the stock market on several macroeconomic and
microeconomic variables. For this reason, these studies make a signiﬁcant
eﬀort to date correctly diﬀerent liberalization eﬀorts. Early and ambitious
eﬀorts along these lines were made by Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey
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9. The Quinn (1997) index considers separately capital account receipts and payments. The
Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) paper is one of the few where an attempt is made to distinguish
between controls on capital inﬂows and on various types of outﬂows. Their index, however,
covers only one year. For related work see Tamirisa (1999).(1995, 2000), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001). An important
point made by these authors is that using the oﬃcial or legislative dates of
stock market liberalization may be highly misleading. For this reason, the
authors use data on actual net capital ﬂows to date stock market liberal-
ization episodes in a score of countries. More speciﬁcally, they argue that
liberalization episodes may be dated by identifying break points in the net
capital f ﬂows data.10 In a recent study, Edison and Warnock (2003) have
used data on stock markets compiled by the International Finance Corpo-
ration to construct a new index of restrictions on ownership of stock by for-
eigners. This index—which was constructed for twenty-nine countries—
has a high degree of correlation with the index by Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2001).11 Shatz (2000) has built an index on capital account re-
strictions on the basis of restrictions on foreign direct investment in ﬁfty-
seven countries. This index has been used by Desai, Foley, and Forbes
(2004) in a study on the way in which multinational ﬁrms deal with capital
controls.
The selective survey presented in this subsection vividly captures the
diﬃculties that researchers have encountered in their eﬀorts to measure the
degree of capital mobility of particular countries at particular points in
time. It also shows that this is a rapidly moving area of research, which is
likely to continue to evolve in the future. Most recent eﬀorts to improve
measurement have focused on moving away from coarse “closed-open” bi-
nary indexes, and have dealt with two issues: (a) capturing the fact that
when it comes to controls there are “grey areas,” and that there are grada-
tions of restrictions; and (b) allowing comparisons of the intensity of con-
trols across countries and time. In both of these areas there have been con-
siderable improvements in the last few years.
2.3 The Evolution of Capital Mobility in the World Economy: 1970–2001
In this section I analyze the evolution of capital mobility in a large num-
ber of countries—both advanced and emerging—during the last three
decades. The ﬁrst step is to discuss a new index on capital mobility; I then
provide evidence of the extent to which countries have liberalized their cap-
ital account in the last ten years.
In order to analyze the evolution of capital account restrictions I con-
structed a new index on capital mobility that combines information from
Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002), with information from coun-
try-speciﬁc sources. In creating this new index I followed a three-step pro-
cedure. First, the scales of the Quinn and Mody and Murshid indexes were
Capital Controls, Sudden Stops, and Current Account Reversals 81
10. See also Henry (2000).
11. See Edison et al. (2002) for a survey of studies on the eﬀect of capital account restric-
tions on stock markets.made compatible. The new index has a scale from 0 to 100, where higher
numbers denote a higher degree of capital mobility; a score of 100 denotes
absolutely free capital mobility. Second, I use Stata’s “impute” procedure
to deal with missing observations in the new index. In order to impute pre-
liminary values to the missing observations I use data on the two original
indexes (Quinn and Mody-Murshid), their lagged values, openness as mea-
sured by import tariﬀ collections over imports, the extent of trade open-
ness measured as imports plus exports over GDP, and GDP per capita.12
In the third step, I use country-speciﬁc data to revise and reﬁne the pre-
liminary data created using the “impute” procedure discussed above. The
new index covers the period 1970–2000, and has data for 163 countries (al-
though not every country has data for every year). It is important to note
that although this new index is a clear improvement over alternative in-
dexes, it still has some shortcomings, including the fact that it does not dis-
tinguish very sharply between restrictions on capital inﬂows and restric-
tions on capital outﬂows.13
In ﬁgure 2.1 I present the evolution of the new index for six groups of
countries: (a) industrial countries, (b) Latin America and the Caribbean,
(c) Asia, (d) Africa, (e) the Middle East and North Africa, and (f) Eastern
Europe. This ﬁgure clearly captures the fact that the degree of capital mo-
bility has increased in every one of these six regions during the last three
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12. See Aizenman and Noy (2004) on the relationship between trade account openness and
capital account openness.
13. See the discussion in the preceding section for an analysis of the shortcomings of diﬀer-
ent indexes. See also Eichengreen (2001) and Edwards (1999).
Fig. 2.1 Capital mobility index, 1970–2000
Note: Figure shows graphs by region code: 1   industrial countries, 2   Latin America and
Caribbean, 3   Asia, 4   Africa, 5   Middle East, 6   Eastern Europe.decades. A comparison of the 1970–89 and 1990–2000 periods suggests
that, on average, the industrial countries made the most progress in mov-
ing toward greater capital mobility; their average index went from 66.5 to
88.8. The Middle East and North African countries, on the other hand, ex-
perienced only moderate capital account liberalization. Their capital mo-
bility index went from an average of 41.3 to 49.1. Figure 2.1 also shows that
this process of ﬁnancial openness has followed diﬀerent patterns in the
diﬀerent regions. For instance, in the industrial countries it has been a rel-
atively smooth process; in the Latin American countries, on the other
hand, it is possible to see stricter capital account restrictions during the
1970s and 1980s, with an increase in the extent of capital mobility in the
1990s. In Asia, there was an increase in capital mobility during the early
1990s, followed by a somewhat abrupt imposition of controls after the 1997
crises. Since then, capital mobility has increased somewhat. Not surpris-
ingly, Eastern Europe is the region that has experienced the greatest dis-
crete jump in the degree of capital mobility.
As a way of gaining further insights into the evolution of capital mobil-
ity during the period 1970–2001, I used data on the new index on capital
mobility to divide the sample into three equal-size groups depending on
the extent of mobility. These groups have been labeled High, Intermediate,
and Low mobility.14 This three-way division of the sample clearly captures
the fact that the degree of capital mobility has increased signiﬁcantly dur-
ing the last thirty years. In 1970, 44 percent of the observations corre-
sponded to Low mobility; 26 percent to Intermediate; and 30 percent to
Highmobility. In the year 2000, in contrast, 24 percent of the observations
corresponded to Low mobility; 25 percent to Intermediate; and 52 percent
to High mobility. Table 2.1 contains summary data on the index of capital
mobility for the Lowand Highmobility groups.15As may be seen, the mean
and median values of the index are very diﬀerent across groups. Indeed, a
test with the equality of means indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected
at a high degree of conﬁdence (t-statistic   136.9).
In order to illustrate which type of country belongs to each group, in
table 2.2 I present a list of a subset of nations with High and Low capital
mobility. These subsets focus on the extremes of the distributions and cap-
ture countries with Very High mobility (index value equal or higher than
87.5) and Very Low mobility (index value lower or equal to 12.5).16 As may
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14. Since the unit of analysis is a country-year observation, and there has been a trend to-
ward higher capital mobility (see ﬁgure 2.1), most observations in the High mobility group
correspond to recent country-year observations. Likewise, by construction most (but by no
means all) observations in the Low mobility group correspond to early (1970s and 1980s)
country-year observations.
15. In much (but not all) of the analysis that follows I will deal only with the Low and High
restrictions groups. That is, in many of the results that follow the group of countries with In-
termediate restrictions has been dropped.
16. These break points were selected in an arbitrary fashion.Table 2.1 Capital mobility index by group
Group Mean Median Standard deviation
Low capital mobility 30.0 37.5 9.9
High capital mobility 82.5 87.5 12.3
Table 2.2 Countries with very high and very low capital mobility
A. Very high capital mobility
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–2000
Notes: Very high capital mobility countries are those with average mobility index higher than or equal

















Antigua and Barbuda 87.5
Bahrain 87.5
Germany 98.8












































Vanuatu 87.5be seen, while the number of countries with Very High capital mobility in-
creased from decade to decade, the number with Very Low mobility de-
clined, until in the 1990–2000 decade there were no nations with an index
value below 12.5.
Finally, in table 2.3I present a list of countries that during a ﬁve-year pe-
riod experienced major changes in the extent of capital mobility. Panel A
in table 2.3 lists countries that moved from High to Low mobility. As may
be seen, there are relatively few nations that went through a rapid and ex-
treme closing of the capital account. Interestingly, all cases correspond to
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and took place during the
ﬁrst half of the 1980s when the region was going through the debt crisis. In
panel B of table 2.3 I have listed countries that have gone through rapid
capital account liberalizations—these are countries that within ﬁve years
have gone from Low mobility all the way to High capital mobility—skip-
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Table 2.3 Countries with major changes in capital mobility index
A. From high to low capital mobility







B. From low to high capital mobility
Australia Portugal Argentina Colombia
Norway Costa Rica Ecuador














Notes: Panel A shows countries with high capital mobility index in period t – 1 and low capital mobility
index in period t. Panel B shows countries with low capital mobility index in period t – 1 and high capi-
tal mobility index in period t. Index is high if it is higher than 50, low if it is lower than 50.ping, as it were, the adolescence stage of capital mobility. As may be seen,
during the 1980s one emerging country (Uruguay) and three OECD coun-
tries—Australia, Norway, and Portugal—went through this rapid liberal-
ization process. In contrast, during the 1990s an increasingly large number
of emerging countries—including many in Latin America and Africa—
liberalized their capital accounts rapidly.
2.4 The Anatomy of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops:
Is There a Diﬀerence between High and Low Capital
Mobility Countries?
Recent discussions on external crises have tended to focus on two related
phenomena: (a) sudden stops of capital inﬂows, deﬁned as situations in
which the ﬂow of capital coming into a country is reduced signiﬁcantly in
a very short period of time; and (b) current account reversals, or major re-
ductions in the current account deﬁcit that take place within a year or
two.17 In this section I analyze these two phenomena during the last thirty
years, and I rely on nonparametric tests to investigate whether their inci-
dence and main characteristics have been diﬀerent for countries with High
capital mobility and countries with Low mobility.
2.4.1 Incidence of Sudden Stops and Reversals
In this paper I have deﬁned a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and
major reduction in capital inﬂows to a country that up to that time had
been receiving large volumes of foreign capital. More speciﬁcally, I im-
posed the following requirements for an episode to qualify as a sudden
stop: (a) the country in question must have received an inﬂow of capital
(relative to gross domestic product [GDP]) larger than its region’s third
quartile during the two years prior to the sudden stop; (b) net capital in-
ﬂows must have declined by at least 5 percent of GDP inone year.18On the
other hand, a “current account reversal”—reversal, in short—is deﬁned as
a reduction in the current account deﬁcit of at least 4 percent of GDP in
one year.19
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17. The term “sudden stops” was introduced by Rudi Dornbusch and has been popularized
by Guillermo Calvo and his associates. On sudden stops see, for example, Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Mejía (2004) and Edwards (2004a, 2004b). On current account reversals see Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2002, 2004a, 2004b) and Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Vil-
lar (2003). See Taylor (2002) for a fascinating discussion of long-term trends in current ac-
count dynamics. On the long-term interplay between capital ﬂows and the current account,
see Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
18. In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative deﬁnitions
of sudden stops, which considered a reduction in inﬂows of 3 and 7 percent of GDP in one year.
Due to space considerations, however, I don’t report detailed results using these deﬁnitions.
19. I also used an alternative deﬁnition. The qualitative nature of the results discussed be-
low was not aﬀected by the precise deﬁnition of reversals or sudden stops. See Edwards
(2002).Table 2.4 presents tabulation data on the incidence of sudden stops for
the period under study; table 2.5 contains data on the incidence of current
account reversals. In both tables I have considered six groups of coun-
tries—industrial countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia,
Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe. Each table
also includes a Pearson test for equality of incidence across groups of coun-
tries. As may be seen, the total historical incidence of sudden stops has
been 6.4 percent. Diﬀerent countries, however, have experienced very
diﬀerent realities, with the incidence being highest in the Middle East (11.3
percent) and lowest in the industrial nations (3.7 percent). The tabulation
on reversals in table 2.5 indicates that the aggregate incidence rate has been
12.8 percent; Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East have had the
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Table 2.5 Incidence of current account reversals
Region No reversal Reversal
Industrial countries 97.6 2.4
Latin America and Caribbean 84.0 16.0
Asia 87.9 12.1
Africa 83.4 16.6
Middle East 84.0 16.0
Eastern Europe 85.0 15.0
Total 87.2 12.8
No. of observations 2,975
Pearson
Uncorrected  2 (5) 77.88
Design-based F(5, 14870) 15.57
p-value 0.000
Table 2.4 Incidence of sudden stops
Region No sudden stop Sudden stop
Industrial countries 96.3 3.7
Latin America and Caribbean 92.2 7.8
Asia 94.9 5.1
Africa 93.4 6.6
Middle East 88.7 11.3
Eastern Europe 93.7 6.4
Total 93.6 6.4
No. of observations 2,943
Pearson
Uncorrected  2 (5) 18.84
Design-based F(5, 14710) 3.76
p-value 0.002highest incidence at 16 percent, and the industrial countries have had the
lowest incidence at 2.4 percent.
From an analytical perspective sudden stops and reversals should be
highly related phenomena. There is no reason, however, for their relation-
ship to be one to one. Indeed, because of changes in international reserves
it is perfectly possible that a country that suﬀers a sudden stop does not
experience at the same time a current account reversal. In table 2.6 I pre-
sent two-way frequency tables for the sudden stops and the current account
deﬁcit reversal, both for the complete sample and for the six regions. The
table shows that for the complete sample (3,106 observations) 46.8 per-
cent of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current account re-
versal. At the same time, 22.8 percent of those with reversals also experi-
enced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital inﬂows. The regional
data show that joint incidence of reversals and sudden stops has been
highest in Africa, where approximately 59.3 percent of sudden stops hap-
pened at the same time as current account reversals, and in Latin Amer-
ica, where 25 percent of reversals coincided with sudden stops. Notice
that for every one of the regions, as well as for the complete sample, the
Pearson  2 tests have very small p-values, indicating that the observed
diﬀerences across rows and columns are signiﬁcant. That is, these tests
suggest that although there are observed diﬀerences across these phe-
nomena, the two are statistically related. Interestingly, these results do not
change in any signiﬁcant way if diﬀerent deﬁnitions of reversals and sud-
den stops are used, or if alternative conﬁgurations of lags and leads are
considered.
2.4.2 Sudden Stops, Reversals, and Capital Controls
The tabulation results presented above on sudden stops and current ac-
count reversals (tables 2.5 and 2.6) did not group countries according to
their degree of capital mobility. In table 2.7 I report the incidence of both
sudden stops and current account reversals for the three categories of cap-
ital mobility deﬁned above: High, Intermediate, and Low capital mobility.
The table also presents the p-values for Pearson tests on the equality of in-
cidence across regions, as well as t-statistics (and their p-values) on the
equality of incidence under High mobility and Low mobility on the one
hand, and equality of incidence under Highmobility and Intermediatemo-
bility, on the other hand (these tests are presented at both the country-
group and aggregate levels). The results obtained may be summarized as
follows:
• For the complete sample, the incidence of current account reversals is
signiﬁcantly lower for countries with High capital mobility than for
countries with either Intermediate or Low mobility. This aggregate re-
sult is somewhat deceiving, however, since there are marked diﬀer-
88 Sebastian EdwardsTable 2.6 Incidence of current account reversals and sudden stops
All countries: Sudden stop
Reversal 0 1 Total
0 2,587 107 2,694
96.0 4.0 100.0
89.1 53.2 86.7
1 318 94 412
77.2 22.8 100.0
11.0 46.8 13.3
Total 2,905 201 3,106
93.5 6.5 100.0
100 100 100
Pearson  2 (1) 209.65
p-value 0.000
Industrial countries: 
Sudden stop Latin America: Sudden stop
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 552 19 571 605 24 629
96.7 3.3 100.0 96.2 3.8 100.0
98.2 82.6 97.6 87.1 44.4 84.0
1 10 4 14 90 30 120
71.4 28.6 100.0 75.0 25.0 100.0
1.8 17.4 2.4 13.0 55.6 16.0
Total 562 23 585 695 54 749
96.1 3.9 100.0 92.8 7.2 100.0
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson  2 (1) 23.06 67.60
p-value 0.000 0.000
Asia: Sudden stop Africa: Sudden stop
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 328 12 340 689 22 711
96.5 3.5 100.0 96.9 3.1 100.0
87.7 60.0 86.3 85.2 40.7 82.4
1 46 8 54 120 32 152
85.2 14.8 100.0 79.0 21.1 100.0
12.3 40.0 13.7 14.8 59.3 17.6
Total 374 20 394 809 54 863
94.9 5.1 100.0 93.7 6.3 100.0
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson  2 (1) 12.32 68.85
p-value 0.001 0.000
(continued)ences in incidence across groups of countries.20 As may be seen from
table 2.7, for industrial countries the incidence of reversals has been
signiﬁcantly smaller in countries with High mobility. In Asia, on the
other hand, countries with Lowmobility have had a signiﬁcantly lower
incidence of reversals than nations with High capital mobility. For the
rest of the country groups there are no statistical diﬀerences in the in-
cidence of reversals across degrees of capital mobility.
• For sudden stops, the results for the complete sample suggest that
there are no statistical diﬀerences in incidence across countries with
diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. At the country-group levels there
are some diﬀerences, however. For industrial countries the incidence
of sudden stops is smaller under High capital mobility; the opposite is
true for the Asian and Eastern European countries. The t-statistics in
table 2.7 indicate that for Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East
there are no statistical diﬀerences in the incidence of sudden stops ac-
cording to the degree of capital mobility.
The results presented in table 2.7 were obtained when the contempora-
neous value of the index was used to classify countries as having a High, In-
termediate, or Low degree of capital mobility. It is possible to argue, how-
ever, that what matters is not the degree of capital mobility in a particular
year but the policy stance on capital mobility in the medium term. In order
to investigate whether an alternative classiﬁcation makes a diﬀerence, I re-
classiﬁed countries as High, Intermediate, and Low capital mobility using
the average value in the index in the previous ﬁve years. The results ob-
tained are reported in table 2.8; as may be seen, the results are very similar
to those reported in table 2.7.
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Middle East: Sudden stop Eastern Europe: Sudden stop
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 185 13 198 195 11 206
93.4 6.6 100.0 94.7 5.3 100.0
88.5 54.2 85.0 89.9 64.7 88.0
1 2 41 13 52 26 2 8
68.6 31.4 100.0 78.6 21.4 100.0
11.5 45.8 15.0 10.1 35.3 12.0
Total 209 24 233 217 17 234
89.7 10.3 100.0 92.7 7.3 100.0
100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson  2 (1) 19.90 9.47
p-value 0.000 0.002
20. Indeed, according to the Pearson test the null hypothesis of equality of incidence across
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this subsection I investigate whether sudden stops and current ac-
count reversals have historically been related to banking crises. A number
of authors have argued that one of the costliest eﬀects of external shocks is
that they tend to generate banking crises and collapses. Most analyses on
this subject have focused on the joint occurrence of devaluation crises and
banking crises; see, for example, the discussion in Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999). In this subsection I take a slightly diﬀerent approach, and I investi-
gate whether sudden stops and major current account deﬁcits—not all of
which end up in devaluation crises, as established in Edwards (2004b)—
have been associated with banking crises. I address this issue in tables 2.9
and 2.10, where I present two-way tabulations for current account rever-
sals and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if in that year there has
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Table 2.9 Banking crises and current account reversals
Total sample: Banking crisis High mobility: Banking crisis
Reversal 0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 2,443 118 2,561 956 59 1,015
95.4 4.6 100.0 94.2 5.8 100.0
87.1 86.1 87.0 90.7 92.2 90.8
1 363 19 382 98 5 103
95.0 5.0 100.0 95.2 4.9 100.0
12.9 13.9 13.0 9.3 7.8 9.2
Total 2,806 137 2,943 1,054 64 1,118
95.3 4.7 100.0 94.3 5.7 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pearson  2 (1) 0.10 0.16
p-value 0.75 0.91
Intermediate mobility: 
Banking crisis Low mobility: Banking crisis
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 608 22 630 879 37 916
96.5 3.5 100.0 96.0 4.0 100.0
83.0 75.9 82.7 86.3 84.1 86.2
1 125 7 132 140 7 147
94.7 5.3 100.0 95.2 4.8 100.0
17.1 24.1 17.3 13.7 15.9 13.8
Total 733 29 762 1019 44 1063
96.2 3.8 100.0 95.9 4.1 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pearson  2 (1) 0.98 0.17
p-value 0.32 0.68been a banking crisis (table 2.9), and for sudden stops and banking crises
(table 2.10).21 All panels in table 2.9 (see, in particular, the Pearson  2 tests
for independence of rows and columns) show that there has not been a sig-
niﬁcant relationship between reversals and major banking crises. Interest-
ingly, this is the case for all three capital mobility groups.
The results in table 2.10 refer to sudden stops and banking crises, and are
very similar. They indicate that there has been no signiﬁcant relationship—
at any level of capital mobility—between sudden stops and banking crises
(see the Pearson  2 tests for independence of rows and columns). It is im-
portant to note that this is the case independent of the lag-lead structure
considered. In sum, the results reported in tables 2.9 and 2.10 indicate that,
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Table 2.10 Banking crises and sudden stops
Total sample: Banking crisis High mobility: Banking crisis
Sudden stop 0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 2,587 128 2,715 980 59 1,039
95.3 4.7 100.0 94.3 5.7 100.0
93.4 93.4 93.4 93.6 92.2 93.5
1 182 9 191 67 5 72
95.3 4.7 100.0 93.1 6.9 100.0
6.6 6.6 6.6 6.4 7.8 6.5
Total 2,769 137 2,906 1,047 64 1,111
95.3 4.7 100.0 94.2 5.8 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pearson  2 (1) 0.00 0.20
p-value 0.99 0.66
Intermediate mobility: 
Banking crisis Low mobility: Banking crisis
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
0 688 28 716 919 41 960
96.1 3.9 100.0 95.7 4.3 100.0
92.7 96.6 92.9 93.8 93.2 93.8
1 54 1 55 61 3 64
98.2 1.8 100.0 95.3 4.7 100.0
7.3 3.5 7.1 6.2 6.8 6.3
Total 742 29 771 980 44 1024
96.2 3.8 100.0 95.7 4.3 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pearson  2 (1) 0.62 0.03
p-value 0.43 0.87
21. The data on banking crises are from Glick and Hutchison (1999). When an alternative
deﬁnition of reversals is used the results are similar to those reported in this section.contrary to what some critics of capital account liberalization have argued,
higher capital mobility has not been associated with a higher occurrence of
banking crises; banking crises have occurred at the same rate in countries
with High, Intermediate, and Low capital mobility.22
2.5 Capital Controls and the Costs of External Crises
According to the analysis presented in the preceding section, there is no
clear evidence supporting the view that Low capital mobility countries—
that is, countries that impose heavy restrictions (or controls) on the mobil-
ity of capital—have a signiﬁcantly lower incidence of sudden stops or cur-
rent account reversals. In this section I take the analysis a step further and
investigate whether current account reversals and sudden stops have his-
torically had signiﬁcant costs in terms of lower GDP growth. More im-
portant in terms of the current paper, I analyze whether the (potential)
costs of sudden stops and reversals have been diﬀerent in countries with
diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility.
The section is organized as follows: I ﬁrst present a preliminary analysis,
where I compare growth before and after sudden stops and current account
reversal episodes, for countries with diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility. I
then present results obtained from an econometric analysis that estimates
jointly—using treatment regressions—the probability of having a crisis
and the eﬀect of the crisis on GDP growth. As pointed out, the main inter-
est in this analysis is to determine whether the extent of capital mobility
plays a role in explaining countries’ propensity to having crises, and the
costs associated with crises.
2.5.1 Sudden Stops, Current Account Reversals, Capital Controls, 
and Growth: A Preliminary Analysis
In table 2.11 I present a before-and-after analysis of GDP per capita
growth for sudden stops and reversals. This analysis has been done for all
countries, as well as for countries grouped according to their degree of cap-
ital mobility. The “before” data correspond to average GDP per capita
growth during the three yearsbefore the crisis. I have computed two “after”
rates of growth: (a) the year of the crisis, and (b) the average during three
years after the crisis. Panel A in table 2.11 contains the results for one year
after the crisis; panel B contains results for three years after the crisis. The
ﬁrst four columns in both panels of table 2.11 contain the average diﬀer-
ence in the rate of growth per capita after and before the crisis. Column (1)
is for all countries; columns (2) through (4) are for countries with High, In-
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22. I also analyzed the incidence of sudden stops, current account reversals, and IMF pro-
grams. The results obtained indicate that there is no relationship between sudden stops and
reversals on the one hand, and IMF programs on the other.termediate, and Low capital mobility. The numbers in parentheses are
t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the “before” and “after” rates of
growth are equal. The ﬁnal two columns, columns (5) and (6), are diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerence columns, which report the diﬀerence in the before and
after growth rates for High and Intermediate and High and Low capital
mobility; that is, the number in column (5) is equal to column (2) minus col-
umn (3). The number in parentheses is for the null hypothesis that this
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence is equal to zero.
As may be seen from table 2.11, these preliminary results suggest that,
generally speaking, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in growth before
and after the crises; this is the case for all categories of capital mobility. No-
tice that only three out of the twenty-four t-statistics in table 2.11 are sig-
niﬁcant at conventional levels. As emphasized above, however, these re-
sults are only preliminary, since no attempt has been made to control for
other factors or to incorporate the determinants of the probability ofa cri-
sis.23 In the subsection that follows I deal with these issues by using a treat-
ment regression methodology.
2.5.2 An Econometric Analysis
In this subsection I present results from an econometric analysis that
deals with two questions: (a) does a higher degree of capital mobility in-
crease the probability of a crisis (deﬁned as a sudden stop or as a current
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Table 2.11 GDP per capita growth: Before and after
All High Intermediate Low High – Intermediate High – Low
Event (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Results for one year after crisis
Reversal –0.37 –0.54 0.75 –1.21 –1.29 0.67
(1.07) (0.71) (1.54) (2.18)∗∗ (1.44) (0.71)
Sudden stop –0.88 –1.29 0.08 –1.27 –1.37 –0.02
(1.84) (1.60) (0.09) (1.52) (1.17) (0.02)
B. Results for three years after crisis
Reversal –0.09 –0.25 0.75 –0.69 –1.00 0.44
(0.34) (0.51) (2.12)∗∗ (1.54) (1.66) (0.66)
Sudden stop –0.61 –0.31 0.19 –1.55 –0.50 1.24
(1.64) (0.58) (0.31) (2.11)∗∗ (0.62) (1.36)
Notes: The “before” data correspond to average GDP per capita growth during the three years before
the crisis. In panel A, “after” rate of growth is for year of the crisis. In panel B, “after” is average growth
rate during three years after the crisis. t-tests reported (in parentheses) are absolute values.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
23. Hong and Tornell (2005), however, have used a similar methodology and found that
there are growth eﬀects of crises. Their deﬁnition of crisis, however, is diﬀerent from the two
deﬁnitions I have used here.account reversal), and (b) does the degree of capital mobility aﬀect the cost
of crises once they occur? The discussion proceeds as follows: I ﬁrst pre-
senta simple analysis on the eﬀects of sudden stops and current accountre-
versals on growth (the following subsection); I then present results from
the joint estimation of crises’ probabilities and dynamics of growth equa-
tions (the succeeding subsection).
Growth Eﬀects of Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals:
Preliminary Econometric Results
As in Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005), the point of departure of the em-
pirical analysis is a two-equation formulation for the dynamicsof real GDP
per capita growth of country j in period t. Equation (1) is the long-run
GDP growth equation, while equation (2) captures the growth dynamics
process.
(1) gj∗    Xj  Rj    j.
(2)  gtj  (gj∗   gt 1,j)    vt,j   ut,j    t,j.
I have used the following notation: gj∗ is the long-run rate of real per
capita GDP growth in country j; Xj is a vector of structural, institutional,
and policy variables that determine long-run growth; Rj is a vector of re-
gional dummies;  ,  , and   are parameters; and  j is an error term as-
sumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation (2), gt,jis the rate of growth of per
capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms vt,j and ut,j are shocks, as-
sumed to have zero mean, to have ﬁnite variance, and to be uncorrelated
among them. More speciﬁcally, vt,j is assumed to be an external terms-of-
trade shock, while ut,j captures other shocks, including sudden stops and
current account reversals.  t,j is an error term, which is assumed to be het-
eroskedastic (see equation [3] below for details), and  ,  , and   are pa-
rameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth pro-
cess. Equation (2), which has the form of an equilibrium correction model
(ECM), states that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from
the long-run rate of growth due to the existence of three types of shocks:
vt,j, ut,j and  t,j. Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will tend to
converge toward its long-run value, with the rate of convergence given by
 . Parameter  , in equation (2), is expected to be positive, indicating that
an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) accelera-
tion in the rate of growth, and that negative terms-of-trade shocks are ex-
pected to have a negative eﬀect on gt,j.24 The main interest from the per-
spective of the current paper is whether sudden stops and current account
reversals have a negative eﬀect on growth; that is, whether coeﬃcient   is
signiﬁcantly negative. In the actual estimation of equation (1), I used
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24. See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) for details.98 Sebastian Edwards
dummy variables for sudden stops and reversals. An important question,
and one that is addressed in detail in the subsection that follows, is whether
the eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks on growth are diﬀerent for countries with
diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility.
The system in equations (1) and (2) was estimated using a two-step pro-
cedure. In the ﬁrst step I estimate the long-run growth equation (1) using a
cross-country data set. These data are averages for 1974–2000, and the es-
timation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. These ﬁrst-stage esti-
mates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace
g∗
j in the equilibrium error correction model in equation (2). In the second
step, I estimated equation (2) using a generalized least squares (GLS) pro-
cedure for unbalanced panels; I used both random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation procedures. The data set covers 157 countries, for the 1970–
2000 period; not every country has data for every year, however. See the
appendix for exact data deﬁnition and data sources.
The results from the ﬁrst-step estimation of equation (1) are not reported
due to space considerations.25 Table 2.12 presents the results from the
25. In estimating equation (1) for long-run per capita growth, I follow the now standard lit-
erature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and use average data
for 1974–2000. In terms of the equation speciﬁcation, I include the following covariates: the
log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education; an
index of the degree of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption rela-
tive to GDP; and regional dummies for Latin American, sub-Saharan Africa, and transition
economies. The results are quite standard and support what has become the received wisdom
on the empirical determinants of long-term growth.
Table 2.12 Current account reversals, sudden stops, and growth (GLS estimates)
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6)
R.E. F.E. R.E. F.E. R.E. F.E.
Constant –0.15 –0.14 –0.27 –0.25 –0.14 –0.10
(1.16) (1.41) (2.62)∗∗∗ (2.44)∗∗ (1.32) (0.97)
Growth gap 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.87 0.82 0.88
(42.10)∗∗∗ (42.73)∗∗∗ (40.18)∗∗∗ (41.62)∗∗∗ (40.76)∗∗∗ (42.28)∗∗∗
Change in terms of trade 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
(12.65)∗∗∗ (12.19)∗∗∗ (11.31)∗∗∗ (10.74)∗∗∗ (12.18)∗∗∗ (11.75)∗∗∗
Reversal –2.01 –2.10 –1.80 –1.97
(6.64)∗∗∗ (6.72)∗∗∗ (5.50)∗∗∗ (5.82)∗∗∗
Sudden stop –1.23 –1.25 –0.54 –0.60
(2.82)∗∗∗ (2.77)∗∗∗ (1.19) (1.31)
No. of observations 1,821 1,821 1,641 1,641 1,635 1,635
Countries 90 90 81 81 81 81
R2 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52
Notes: R.E.   random eﬀect; F.E.   ﬁxed eﬀect; t-tests reported (in parentheses) are absolute values;
country-speciﬁc dummies are included, but not reported.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.second-step estimation of the growth dynamics equation (2). The ﬁrst two
equations refer to current account reversals, while the next two equations
focus on sudden stops. Finally, in the table’s equations (5) and (6) I included
both the sudden stops and the reversals variables as regressors.
The estimated coeﬃcient of (gj∗ – gt–1,j) is, as expected, positive, signiﬁ-
cant, and smaller than 1. The point estimates are on the high side—be-
tween 0.81 and 0.88—suggesting that, on average, deviations between
long-run and actual growth get eliminated rather quickly. For instance,
according to equation (1) in table 2.12, after three years approximately 90
percent of a unitary shock to real GDP growth per capita will be elimi-
nated. Also, as expected, the estimated coeﬃcients of the terms-of-trade
shock are always positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that an
improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade results in an accelera-
tion (deceleration) in the rate of growth of real per capita GDP. As may be
seen from equations (1) and (2) in the table, the coeﬃcient of the current
account reversals variable is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that rever-
sals result in a deceleration of growth. The point estimate is –2.01, indi-
cating that, with other things given, a reversal has on average resulted in a
2 percent reduction in short-term growth on average. The results from
equations (3) and (4) in the table refer to sudden stops. They show that the
estimated coeﬃcients of the sudden-stop dummies are signiﬁcantly nega-
tive, with a point estimate that ranges from –1.23 to –1.25. This suggests
that while sudden stops also have a negative eﬀect on per capita growth,
their impact on growth has not been as severe as the impact of reversal
episodes.
The results in the table 2.12 equations (5) and (6), where both the current
account reversals and the sudden-stop dummies have been included, are
particularly interesting: while the reversal dummies continue to be signiﬁ-
cantly negative, the coeﬃcient for the sudden-stop dummy is not signiﬁ-
cant any longer. This suggests that what is costly—in terms of lower GDP
per capita growth—is not a sudden stop per se. Indeed, according to these
results, what is costly in terms of lower growth is a current account rever-
sal. This is an important ﬁnding, since it suggests that countries that expe-
rience a sudden stop but are able to avoid a current account reversal,
through the use of international reserves, will not face a signiﬁcant decline
in growth. Moreover, this result suggests that sudden stops have an indirect
(negative) eﬀect on growth. According to this conjecture, the occurrence of
a sudden stop increases the probability of a current account reversal. The
reversal, in turn, will have a negative impact on GDP per capita growth. I
formally investigate this hypothesis in the subsection that follows.
Joint Estimation
I use a treatment eﬀects model to estimate jointly an equation on real
GDP growth and a probit equation on the probability that a country expe-
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model is as follows:
(1 ) gj∗    Xj  Rj    j.
(2 )  gt,j    (gj∗   gt 1,j)    vt, j    ut, j    (ut,j   Opennesst,j)    t,j.
(3) ut,j   
(4) u∗
t,j   Wj,t  εj,t.
As before, equation (1 ) is the long-term real growth equation, and equa-
tion (2 ) is the growth dynamics equation, with uj,t a dummy variable (i.e.,
the treatment variable) that takes a value of one if country j in period t ex-
perienced a current account reversal, and zero if the country did not expe-
rience reversal. Accordingly,   is the parameter of interest: the eﬀect of the
treatment on the outcome. Finally, the product ut,j   Opennesst,j interacts
ut,j with a measure of openness. The coeﬃcient of this interactive variable
 will capture the eﬀect of openness on the transmission of external shocks
on growth. In the estimation I used two alternative measures of openness:
the index of capital account openness presented in section 2.3 of this pa-
per, and a measure of trade openness (deﬁned as the ratio of exports plus
imports over GDP).
According to equation (3), whether the country experiences a current
account reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent vari-
able u∗
j,t—which in turn is assumed to depend linearly on vector Wj,t. In the
estimation, one of the Wj,t variables is the degree of capital mobility, or ﬁ-
nancial openness. Some of the variables in Wj,t may be included in Xj,t.26
  and   are parameter vectors to be estimated;  j,t and εj,t are error terms
assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariance matrix
given by
(5)   
If equations (2 ) and (3) are independent, the covariance term  in equa-
tion (5) will be zero. Under most plausible conditions, however, it is likely
that this covariance term will be diﬀerent from zero (see Wooldridge 2002
for details). The model in equations (1 )–(5) will satisfy the consistency and
identifying conditions of mixed models with latent variables if the outcome




t,j   0
0 otherwise
100 Sebastian Edwards
26. For details on the identiﬁcation requirements for this type of models see, for example,
Wooldridge (2002).not one of the variables in W in equation (4).27 As is clear in the discussion
that follows, in the estimation of the model in equations (1 )–(5) we impose
a number of exclusionary restrictions; that is, a number of variables in vec-
tor Wj,t are not included in vector Xj,t.
The system in equations (1 )–(5) was estimated using a three-step proce-
dure. The ﬁrst step consists of estimating the long-run growth equation
[1 ]). The results from this estimation are used to compute the growth gap
term (gj∗ – gt–1,j). In the second step the treatment equation on the proba-
bility of having a current account reversal is estimated using a probit pro-
cedure. From this estimation a hazard is obtained for each j, t observation.
In the third step, the outcome equation (2 ) is estimated with the hazard
added as an additional covariate; in this third step the outcome equation is
estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects. From the residuals of this augmented out-
come regression, it is possible to compute consistent estimates of the vari-
ance-covariance matrix, equation (4). (See Maddala 1983 and Wooldridge
2002 for details.)
The Treatment Equation. Following work by Frankel and Rose (1996),
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), and Edwards (2002), among others, in
the estimation of the ﬁrst treatment (probit) I included the following co-
variates:
• The index of capital mobility discussed in section 2.3. If, as critics of
capital mobility have argued, greater mobility increases countries’
vulnerability to crises, the estimated coeﬃcient should be signiﬁcantly
positive.
• The ratio of the current account deﬁcit to GDP lagged one and two
periods. It is expected that, with other things given, countries with a
larger current account deﬁcit will have a higher probability of experi-
encing a reversal. The best results were obtained when the one-year
lagged deﬁcit was included.
• A sudden-stop dummy that takes the value of one if the country in
question has experienced a sudden stop in that particular year. Its co-
eﬃcient is expected to be positive.
• An index that measures the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the
country’s region (excluding the country itself) during that particular
year. This variable captures the eﬀect of “regional contagion”; its co-
eﬃcient is expected to be positive.
• The one-year lagged external debt–GDP ratio. Its coeﬃcient is ex-
pected to be positive.
• An index that measures whether the country in question has been sub-
ject to a banking crisis during the year in question. Its coeﬃcient will
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27. Details on identiﬁcation and consistency of models with mixed structures can be found
in Maddala (1983). See also Heckman (1978) and Angrist (2000).measure the extent to which banking and external (i.e., current ac-
count) reversals have tended to occur jointly.
• The ratio of net international reserves to GDP, lagged one year. Its co-
eﬃcient is expected to be negative, indicating that, with other things
given, countries with a higher stock of reserves have a lower probabil-
ity of experiencing a current account reversal.
• Short-term (less than one-year maturity) external debt as a proportion
of external debt, lagged one period. Its coeﬃcient is expected to be
positive.
• The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit. Its coeﬃcient
is expected to be positive.
• The lagged ratio of external debt service to exports. Again, its coeﬃ-
cient is expected to be positive.
• The country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs).
• Country ﬁxed eﬀect dummies.
In some of the probit regressions I also included an index that measures the
extent of dollarization in the country in question. Also, in some speciﬁca-
tions I included the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP, and
the public-sector deﬁcit (both lagged). Their coeﬃcients were not signiﬁ-
cant, however. Since these three variables were available for a smaller num-
ber of observations than the other variables, they were not included in the
ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the probit equations reported in this section.
In table 2.13 I summarize the basic results obtained from the estimation
of number of treatment models for GDP growth (the coeﬃcients of the
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect variables are not reported due to space con-
siderations). The table contains two panels. Panel A includes the results
from the growth outcome equation (2 ); panel B contains the estimates for
the treatment equation, or probit equation on the probability of experi-
encing a current account reversal. As pointed out above, the treatment ob-
servations correspond to current account reversal episodes, and the un-
treated group is comprised of all country-year observations where there
have been no reversals.28 Table 2.13 also includes the estimated coeﬃcient
of the hazard variable in the third-step estimation, as well as the estimated
elements of the variance-covariance matrix, equation (5).
Probability of Experiencing a Current Account Reversal. The probit esti-
mates are presented in panel B of table 2.13. I discuss ﬁrst the results in
equations (1) and (2), since they were estimated over a larger sample. As
may be seen, the results are similar across models and are quite satisfactory.
Most of the coeﬃcients have the expected signs, and many of them are sta-
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28. Naturally, countries and time periods included in the analysis are determined by data
availability. For many countries there are no data on the (potential) determinants of the prob-
ability of a current account reversal, including data on external debt and its characteristics.Table 2.13 Growth, current account reversals, and sudden stops: Treatment eﬀects
model (three-step estimates)
Variable Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
A. Results from growth equation
Growth gap 0.87 0.87 0.86
(32.63)∗∗∗ (32.66)∗∗∗ (25.76)∗∗∗
Terms of trade 0.07 0.07 0.07
(8.48)∗∗∗ (8.43)∗∗∗ (6.47)∗∗∗
Reversal –5.35 –3.93 –6.72
(4.83)∗∗∗ (2.86)∗∗∗ (3.69)∗∗∗
Reversal   openness 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2.22)∗∗ (2.38)∗∗ (0.97)
Reversal   capital mobility –0.03∗ –0.005
(1.70) (0.19)
B. Results from treatment equation
Capital mobility (–1) –0.007 –0.007 –0.008
(1.47) (1.48) (1.56)
Current account deﬁcit to GDP (–1) 0.10 0.10 0.11
(8.16)∗∗∗ (8.16)∗∗∗ (5.93)∗∗
Sudden stop 0.67 0.67 0.63
(3.09)∗∗∗ (3.08)∗∗∗ (2.26)∗∗
Sudden stops in region 1.34 1.34 1.09
(2.08)∗∗ (2.08)∗∗ (1.43)
Reserves to GDP (–1) –16.95 –16.85 –5.47
(1.87)∗ (1.86)∗ (0.40)
Domestic credit growth (–1) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(1.33) (1.33) (1.12)
Banking crisis 0.19 0.18 0.16
(0.79) (0.76) (0.63)
External debt to GDP (–1) 0.004 0.004 0.004
(2.11)∗∗ (2.11)∗∗ (1.47)
Short-term debt (–1) –0.007 –0.007 –0.0001
(0.75) (0.77) (0.00)
Debt services (–1) –0.002 –0.002 –0.001
(0.37) (0.36) (0.18)




Hazard lambda 1.18 1.23 1.85
(2.45)∗∗ (2.56)∗∗ (2.85)∗∗∗
Rho 0.29 0.30 0.45
Sigma 4.11 4.11 4.11
Wald  2 (215) 1,190.70 1,190.74 786.2
No. of observations 1,071 1,069 647
Notes: Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses; (–1) denotes a one-period
lagged variable; country-speciﬁc dummies are included but not reported.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. A particularly interesting result
is that in every equation the estimated coeﬃcient of the capital mobility in-
dex was negative (although it was not signiﬁcant at conventional levels).
This was also the case when lagged values of this index were included in the
estimation. These results suggest that, contrary to what has been argued by
the critics of ﬁnancial liberalization, a greater degree of capital account
openness has not increased the degree of vulnerability in the world econ-
omy. If anything, these results provide some (preliminary and weak) evi-
dence suggesting that countries with a higher degree of capital mobility
have had a lower probability of experiencing a current account reversal.
The results in panel B of table 2.13 also indicate that the probability of ex-
periencing a reversal is higher for countries with a large (lagged) current
account deﬁcit and a high external debt ratio. Countries that have experi-
enced a sudden stop also have a high probability of a current account re-
versal, as do countries that are in a region where many countries experience
a sudden stop (i.e., there is evidence of regional contagion). The coeﬃcient
of net international reserves is negative, as expected, and it is signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level in equations (1) and (2). The coeﬃcients of the short-
term debt and total debt service have the expected signs but tend not to be
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of initial GDP per capita are negative but not
signiﬁcant. Overall, when diﬀerent lag structures of the regressors were
considered, the nature of the results did not change.
An important policy issue has to do with the eﬀects of dollarization and
dollarized liabilities on macroeconomic vulnerability and on the costs of
crises. If, as argued by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003), countries with
dollarized ﬁnancial systems are particularly vulnerable to external shocks,
one would expect that dollarization would positively aﬀect the probability
of facing a reversal. Unfortunately, there are no extensive data sets on dol-
larization across countries and time. It is possible, however, to use a more
limited data set—limited in terms of both year and country coverage—to
further investigate this issue. I use the data set recently assembled by Rein-
hart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) that covers 117 countries for the period
1996–2001. This index goes from 1 to 30, with higher numbers indicating
higher degrees of dollarization. The results obtained when this index is in-
cluded in the treatment regression are reported in equation (3) of table
2.13. As may be seen, the estimated coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that a higher degree of dollarization increases the probability of
a country experiencing a current account reversal.29 This result supports
ﬁndings by Edwards (2004b) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004). No-
tice, however, that due to the limited nature of the dollarization data, the
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29. The Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) dollarization index refers only to the pe-
riod 1996–2002. I have assumed, however, that the extent of dollarization detected by Rein-
hart et al. applies to the 1976–2000 period. For this reason the results reported here should be
taken with a grain of salt.number of observations in regression (3) is signiﬁcantly smaller than in the
original regressions.
GDP Growth Models. The results from the estimation of the growth equa-
tion are reported in panel A of table 2.13. I discuss ﬁrst the results from the
ﬁrst two equations that exclude the dollarization variable. As may be seen,
the coeﬃcient for the growth gap variable is signiﬁcantly positive and
smaller than one, as expected. The point estimates are similar to those re-
ported in table 2.12. Also, as in table 2.12 the coeﬃcients of the terms-of-
trade shocks are signiﬁcantly positive. The coeﬃcient of the current ac-
count reversal variable is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that a current
account reversal has a negative eﬀect on growth.
Interestingly, in both equations (1) and (2) of table 2.13 the coeﬃcient of
the variable that interacts the reversal dummy and an index of trade open-
ness are signiﬁcantly positive. This means that the less open the country is
to trade, the higher will be the cost of a current account reversal, in terms
of lower growth. These results are consistent with a number of open econ-
omy macroeconomic models, which postulate that the costs of foreign
shocks—including the costs of current account reversals—are inversely
proportional to the country’s degree of openness. In the Mundell-Fleming
type of models, for example, the expenditure reducing eﬀort, for any given
level of expenditure switching, is inversely proportional to the marginal
propensity to import. Recently, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) devel-
oped a model where sudden stops result in abrupt current account rever-
sals and in major real exchange rate depreciations. Depreciations, in turn,
are contractionary, with the extent of the contraction depending inversely
on the degree of trade openness of the economy. They argue that sudden
stops and current account reversals will have a greater impact in closed
economies, such as Argentina, than in more open ones, such as Chile.
In order to investigate how the degree of capital mobility aﬀects the cost
of an external crisis characterized by a current account reversal, in equa-
tion (2) of table 2.13 I also included a variable that interacts the current
account reversal with the capital mobility index. As may be seen, the es-
timated coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
According to these results the growth eﬀects of a reversal are given by the
following expression:
(6) Growth eﬀect    3.93   0.02   Trade openness 
  0.03   Capital mobility.
This means that, with other things given, the decline in GDP per capita
growth will be more pronounced in a country with a higher degree of cap-
ital mobility that in one with a lower degree of capital mobility. Consider,
for example, the case of two countries that have the same degree of trade
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low degree of capital mobility (an index of 25), the other country has a high
degree of mobility (index of 90). According to equation (6) the country
with low capital mobility will experience a decline in growth of 3.48 per-
cent as a consequence of the reversal. The country with high mobility, on
the other hand, will experience a decline in growth of 5.43 percent.
Finally, in equation (3) of table 2.13 I included a dollarization index in
the treatment equation. As discussed earlier, the estimated coeﬃcient is
positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that countries with a higher degree of
dollarization have a higher probability of experiencing a reversal. Notice
that in the outcome equation on GDP growth, equation (3), the reversal co-
eﬃcient is still signiﬁcantly negative. The coeﬃcients of the two interactive
variables (reversal and trade openness, and reversal and capital mobility)
are not signiﬁcant any longer. This, however, is likely to be the result of us-
ing a much smaller and restricted data set than in the two base equations.
To summarize, the results reported in this section indicate that current
account reversals are costly, in the sense that they result in a (temporary)
reduction in GDP per capita growth. Notice that this contrasts with results
reported by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), who argued that “rever-
sals. . . are not systematically associated with a growth slowdown” (p. 303).
The results reported in this paper also indicate that it is the reversals that
are costly; once reversals are introduced into the analysis, the coeﬃcient of
sudden stops is not signiﬁcant in the growth dynamics equations. The re-
gression results reported in table 2.13 also indicate that the degree of capi-
tal mobility does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of a coun-
try facing a crisis. However, these results indicate that once a reversal has
taken place, countries with a higher degree of capital mobility will experi-
ence a deeper drop in growth.
Endogeneity and Robustness
The results presented in table 2.13 assume that capital mobility is exoge-
nous to the current account. In particular, it is assumed that the restric-
tions on capital mobility don’t change if the probability of a reversal be-
comes higher. This, however, need not be the case. Indeed, some authors
have argued that as a country’s external position worsens, policymakers
will have the temptation to heighten restrictions on capital mobility, and in
particular on capital outﬂows.30 If this is indeed the case, estimates that ig-
nore potential endogeneity will be biased.31 In order to address this issue I
estimated the equation on the probability of experiencing a current ac-
count reversal using an instrumental variables probit procedure based on
Amemiya’s GLS estimators with endogenous regressors. In the estimation
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30. See, for example, Edwards (1989).
31. Notice, however, that the results in table 2.13 use the lagged value of the capital mobil-
ity index.I used two alternative sets of instruments. The ﬁrst set includes change in
the terms of trade (as a measure of external real shocks), the world rate of
interest (as a measure of external ﬁnancial shocks), and a measure of trade
openness obtained as the ﬁtted value from a gravity model of bilateral
trade.32In the second set of instruments, I added the three-year lagged cur-
rent account balance to the ﬁrst set of instruments. The results obtained
under both sets of instruments are very similar; they are presented in table
2.14. As may be seen, by and large, these instrumental variables probit es-
timates conﬁrm the results presented in panel B of table 2.13 for the treat-
ment regressions. The signs of all coeﬃcients have been preserved. It is im-
portant to notice, however, that the coeﬃcients of international reserves
and external debt, which were signiﬁcant in table 2.13, are not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels intable 2.14. More important for the sub-
ject of this paper, the coeﬃcient of the capital mobility index continues to
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32. As Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection be-
tween trade openness and the degree of capital mobility. The use of gravity trade equations to
generate instruments in panel estimation has been pioneered by JeﬀFrankel. See, for example,
Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
Table 2.14 Determinants of current account reversals: Instrumental variables
probit model
Variable Set one Set two
Capital mobility (–1) –0.004 –0.002
(0.42) (0.19)
Current account deﬁcit to GDP (–1) 0.064 0.065
(8.06)∗∗∗ (8.33)∗∗∗
Sudden stop 0.868 0.861
(4.74)∗∗∗ (4.79)∗∗∗
Sudden stops in region 1.761 1.771
(3.13)∗∗∗ (3.25)∗∗∗
Reserves to GDP (–1) –2.935 –4.437
(0.56) (0.84)
Domestic credit growth (–1) 0.0001 0.0001
(0.66) (0.60)
External debt to GDP (–1) 0.001 0.001
(1.10) (0.93)
Short-term debt (–1) 0.002 0.004
(0.39) (0.84)
Debt services (–1) –0.008 –0.007
(1.46) (1.29)
Initial GDP per capita 0.094 0.065
(0.86) (0.58)
No. of observations 1,071 1,071
Notes: Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses; (–1) denotes a one-period
lagged variable; country-speciﬁc dummies are included but not reported. For a list of the in-
struments used, see the text.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.be negative and insigniﬁcant, indicating that the probability of a current
account reversal is not diﬀerent for countries with a high degree of capital
mobility than for countries with a low degree of capital mobility.
In order to investigate further the robustness of the results reported in
tables 2.12 and 2.13 I analyzed the potential role of outliers, and I consid-
ered somewhat diﬀerent samples, as well as diﬀerent speciﬁcations. These
robustness checks indicate that, from a qualitative point of view, the results
discussed above are not aﬀected by the choice of sample, speciﬁcation, or
outliers. Further research, however, should focus on generating more de-
tailed and comprehensive indexes of capital mobility.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have used a broad multicountry data set to analyze the re-
lationship between restrictions to capital mobility and external crises. The
analysis focuses on two manifestations of external crises that have received
considerable attention during the last few years: sudden stops of capital in-
ﬂows, and current account reversals. I have tried to deal with two impor-
tant policy-related issues: ﬁrst, does the extent of capital mobility aﬀect
countries’ degree of vulnerability to external crises, and second, does the
extent of capital mobility determine the depth of external crises—as mea-
sured by the decline in growth—once the crises occur?
In analyzing these issues I relied on two complementary approaches.
First, I used a methodology based on the computation of nonparametric
tests and frequency tables to analyze the incidence and main characteris-
tics of both sudden stops and current account reversals in countries with
diﬀerent degrees of capital controls. Second, I used a regression-based
analysis that estimates jointly the probability of having a crisis, and the cost
of such a crisis, in terms of short-term declines in output growth. Overall,
my results cast some doubts on the assertion that increased capital mobil-
ity has caused heightened macroeconomic vulnerabilities. I have found no
systematic evidence suggesting that countries with higher capital mobility
tend to have a higher incidence of crises, or tend to face a higher probabil-
ity of having a crisis, than countries with lower mobility. My results do sug-
gest, however, that once a crisis occurs, countries with higher capital mo-
bility tend to face a higher cost in terms of growth decline.
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Description of the Data
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Index of capital  Index: 0 (low mobility) to 100  Author’s construction based on 
mobility (high mobility) indexes of capital restrictions 
computed by Quinn (2003) and
Mody and Murshid (2002), and on
country-speciﬁc data
Current account  Reduction in the current account  Author’s construction based on 
reversal deﬁcit of at least 4% of GDP in  data of current account deﬁcit 
one year, when initial balance is  (World Development Indicators)
indeed a deﬁcit
Sudden stop Reduction of net capital inﬂows  Author’s construction based on 
of at least 5% of GDP in one  data of ﬁnancial account (World 
year, when the country in ques- Development Indicators)
tion received an inﬂow of capital 
larger than its region’s third quar-
tile during the previous two years 
prior to the sudden stop.
Banking crisis Dummy variable for occurrence  Glick and Hutchinson (1999)
of a banking crisis
Dollarization Index: 0 (low dollarization) to 30  Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano 
(high dollarization) (2003)
Terms of trade Change in terms of trade as  World Development Indicators
capacity to import (constant 
local currency units)
Openness Trade openness: exports plus  World Development Indicators
imports over GDP
Reserves to GDP Net international reserves over  World Development Indicators
GDP
Domestic credit  Annual growth rate of domestic  World Development Indicators
growth credit
External debt to  Total external debt over GDP World Development Indicators
GDP
Short-term debt Short-term debt as percentage  World Development Indicators
of total external debt
Debt services Total debt services as percentage  World Development Indicators
of exports of goods and services
GDP per capita GDP per capita in US$ (1995) World Development Indicators
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Comment Alan M. Taylor
This paper by Sebastian Edwards sheds light on one of the most heated pol-
icy questions in international macroeconomics: can capital controls help
governments prevent crises? Although theory and introspection might
provide an unambiguous positive answer to that question under laboratory
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search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.conditions, the real world does not always conform to the tidy assumptions
of our toy models. Thus, the question is ultimately an empirical one, and
the author is to be congratulated for bringing a formidable range of applied
tools and new data to construct an answer. And the answer, subject to var-
ious qualiﬁcations, would seem to be negative. Across countries and across
time there appears to be very little correlation between the intensity of cap-
ital controls and crisis events. The only qualiﬁcation oﬀered is that, once a
crisis is underway, there is a risk of a greater output loss during the crisis
when capital is more internationally mobile, a result that seems quite
plausible.
There is not much to quibble with here. This is a clearly written and well-
executed paper. Its results fall in line with, and lend additional weight to,
an emerging empirical literature that challenges the standard prescrip-
tions. In these comments I will review the approach of the paper, oﬀer a few
constructive criticisms, and try to suggest directions for future research.
The paper starts with a nice motivation: a brief history of the (so-called)
Washington Consensus, or at least of how it has been interpreted on the is-
sue of capital mobility.1 It is a familiar tale, and need not be recounted at
great length. In the early 1990s, several emerging-market countries elected
to liberalize their capital markets in line with the then conventional wis-
dom. Starting in 1997 in Asia, some of these countries experienced crises.
Soon alternative views started to be heard. Some suggested that the liber-
alization had been premature and inappropriate, and even that it had been
done under pressure from identiﬁable external sources, conspiratorially
termed the “[IMF–] Wall Street–Treasury complex” (Bhagwati 1998;
Wade and Veneroso 1998). In this drama, the villains are top IMF oﬃcials,
Treasury brass, and major investment banks. These critics, plus other
noted economists like Krugman (1998), Rodrik (1998), and Stiglitz (2002),
questioned the wisdom of a policy of international capital mobility in
emerging markets. The media perceived that the IMF was “chastened”
(Blustein 2001). The seemingly inevitable post–Cold War advance toward
an ever more economically integrated new world order suddenly faltered as
antiglobalization sentiment pushed back. In defense of the still-prevailing
consensus within the profession, other leading economists and ﬁnanciers
such as Fischer (2004), Rogoﬀ (2003), Rubin (2003), and Summers (2000)
have stepped up to give their accounts of events. Still, no agreement be-
tween the two sides seems near.
Edwards steers us away from the heat in this debate and urges that we
look systematically for some light. To that end, some well-deﬁned and
testable propositions must be teased out from the rhetoric of policy briefs,
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1. I say “so-called” because, in fairness to John Williamson (1990), the originator of that
buzzword, his original policy recommendations were a broad and coherent package and their
references to capital mobility very carefully nuanced.op-eds, and “airport economics.” The antiglobalization position, insofar
as it pertains to capital mobility, is summed up by Edwards in two propo-
sitions: capital controls can (1) reduce the risk of crisis and (2) reduce the
impact of a crisis by enabling countercyclical monetary policy.
In theory, the ﬁrst claim follows because if controls were literally imper-
meable, then they would forcibly prevent capital ﬂight. A crisis, as conven-
tionally deﬁned, would then be impossible. Again in theory, the second
claim follows since capital controls undo the forces of interest arbitrage
and allow domestic interest rates to be set independently of world condi-
tions. By resolving the classic trilemma in favor of autonomy, countries
with “fear of ﬂoating” can both manage their exchange rates (to limit price
volatility and to prevent damaging balance-sheet eﬀects in the ﬁnancial
system) and yet still pull the levers of monetary policy in an attempt to re-
vive their economy.
In reality, of course, controls are leaky and require adept implementa-
tion. Leakage would obviously compromise the two claims. As for imple-
mentation, policymakers may incline toward making hay while the sun
shines. Hence, controls tend to be lifted when incipient ﬂows are inward, as
this ﬂow helps the economy to grow. But controls may not be implemented
in time to prevent a crisis event when the tide starts to ebb. If they are im-
posed too late, they will fail to stop the crisis and are likely to end up gen-
erating the reverse correlation in the data (i.e., crises would end up being
associated with the presence of controls, not their absence). Less naively, if
the risk of capital controls being implemented is anticipated, this could in-
duce a crisis too (or, alternatively, discourage the capital inﬂow in the ﬁrst
place).
These numerous qualiﬁcations suggest an empirical investigation is
needed, and Edwards assembles a formidable data set to address the ques-
tions. Data requirements are a binary variable that indicates the occur-
rence of a crisis; a measure of the cost of the crisis, such as an output loss;
and a measure of capital controls.
The crisis indicator takes two forms: “sudden stop” or “current account
reversal.” These are ﬁne choices, but not the only ones available in the lit-
erature. The emphasis here is on the balance of payments in the aggregate,
not on oﬃcial reserves. So we have to be aware that the object of study is
balance-of-payments crises, not currency crises or ﬁnancial crises. In es-
sence we are looking at a quantity measure of the worsening of the coun-
try’s external ﬁnancing position, and the trigger is some threshold for size
or change in the current account. The reversal measure seems quite robust
to diﬀerent thresholds; I worry a little more about the way sudden stops are
deﬁned, particularly with respect to the size of ﬂows in the country’s re-
gion. It is not clear to me why a country cannot be said to suﬀer a sudden
stop if its ﬂows fall oﬀ rapidly from a maximum level for that country, even
if that country’s ﬂows never get large enough to be above the third quartile
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abundance? institutions?) that make it less of a target for ﬂows on average,
but it still might have a hard time if its inﬂows drop by 5 percentage points.
That should also count as a sudden stop, I think. The one other sensitivity
check worth investigating might be to allow for size-dependent hetero-
skedasticity in the current account, and apply some rescaling based on
GDP. Simply put, a 5 percentage point change is far out in the tails of the
current account/GDP distribution for a large country (e.g., the United
States) but not quite as much for a tiny country with a more volatile ratio
of trade balance to GDP.
Overall, these deﬁnitions seem adequate for the task at hand, and my
only anxiety is that the two variables are inherently highly—but not per-
fectly—correlated with one another. This is not a problem if the analysis is
just using two diﬀerent measures for the same purpose as a robustness
check. It might be a problem when we regress one variable on the other, as
happens occasionally (table 2.12). If x is (almost) being regressed on x, the
ﬁt is likely to ﬂatter, and we will have problems estimating the eﬀects of
other independent variables. I’d be happier if neither variable were used as
an independent variable in this way, and both were just kept as variables to
be explained.
The independent variable of most interest (as a cause of crises and their
costs) is capital mobility, which is the most challenging variable to mea-
sure. As is well known, there are few sources for these measures, and re-
searchers have tended to rely on one of a few sources. The IMF’s own data-
base is widely used, but it suﬀers from a simple binary deﬁnition of capital
mobility. This has been joined of late by the pioneering work of Quinn
(2003), who has constructed a more reﬁned annual index of current and
capital account restrictions, a project that has now reached back a century
or more. Authors such as Chinn and Ito (2002), Klein and Olivei (1999),
Mody and Murshid (2002), and Miniane (2004) have also added their own
measures to the literature. As Edwards notes, this is a rapidly evolving area
of research, and we will doubtless see even more indexes soon. Not to be
outdone, Edwards constructs his own index of capital mobility using
Quinn plus Mody and Murshid, plus other country-speciﬁc sources. Like
other measures it has weaknesses, but with the beneﬁt of an algorithm to
impute missing data, it oﬀers very wide coverage by year and by country.
For analytical purposes, the index is used to classify the country-year ob-
servations into three subsets of equal size, referring to high, medium, and
low capital mobility, respectively.
Estimating a crisis model is then a matter of using probit or other mod-
els to ﬁgure out the determinants of crisis events. Estimating the cost of a
crisis is a more routine matter in terms of variable deﬁnitions—we just look
at the growth rate of GDP—but the way to actually extract the postcrisis
eﬀects on growth beneﬁts from the use of a treatment eﬀects model to sort
116 Sebastian Edwardsout short-run and long-run growth eﬀects and allow for a ﬁrst-stage (pro-
bit) equation where the binary crisis event is predicted. This part of the pa-
per should be a model for future researchers seeking to estimate these
kinds of impacts.
The results presented (e.g., table 2.13) show that it is hard to ﬁnd any ev-
idence that restrictions on capital mobility lower the likelihood of a crisis
event. However, conditional on a crisis event having occurred, restrictions
on capital mobility do seem to limit the damage. As far as they go, the re-
sults are convincing. They are also consistent with other contemporary
analyses showing an inverse correlation of various crises with capital con-
trols (Glick and Hutchison 2005; Glick, Guo, and Hutchison 2004). I am
particularly impressed by the rigor of the econometric analysis and the
clarity with which it is presented. Let me simply oﬀer a plea for more re-
search, by Edwards or by others, to address some unresolved questions.
First, what about the type of controls? Can we obtain more indicators
telling us what form controls actually take for each observation? We would
like to know if these results hold up for controls on inﬂows versus controls
on outﬂows. In light of the current fad for all things Chilean—wine, sea
bass, capital controls, pension systems—it would be helpful to know if
there is any sort of robust advantage to one type of control versus another.
The same could be said for controls aimed at “hot” versus “cold” ﬂows
more generally; one might want to think about freeing FDI and long-term
ﬂows while limiting short-term bank ﬂows (exactly the sorts of ﬂows Fis-
cher and others have highlighted as problematic in the Thai case, among
others).
Second, what about temporary versus permanent controls? We might
imagine that a regime committed to permanent controls would fare diﬀer-
ently compared to a regime where policymakers are trying (succeeding?
failing?) to time the application of controls to just stave oﬀ a crisis.
Third, what about contagion? Does the state of the global economy mat-
ter? Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) have found evidence of spillovers
from international crises to the local economy. If you have controls, they
can help insulate you from this type of event. Should some control for this
type of channel be included in the regressions?
Finally, what about institutional quality? Recent work by Klein (2005)
emphasizes that in an average period (including crisis and noncrisis) the
eﬀect of capital mobility is to raise the growth rate, but not in every devel-
oping country—only in emerging markets: countries that are poor enough
to be considered capital scarce but that also maintain some minimum level
of institutional quality (e.g., measured by corruption or rule of law). Could
not a case be made that the incidence and impact of crises may also be
aﬀected by institutional quality?
It would be interesting to see institutional variables placed in the probit
and growth regression models and interacted with capital mobility, be-
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better institutions tame crises? Do they make capital mobility a safer bet?
If so, this would be one more element in a newly forming consensus, a sort
of Washington Consensus II.
In this view, policy reform without institutional reform is a dead end.
This view is not universally embraced in the operational sphere—indeed,
it would require the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) to try to
make more objective, and more politically charged, distinctions between
good and bad borrowers, something their governmental masters are prob-
ably loath to do. Yet these ideas might be seen as gaining some limited trac-
tion—for example, in the eﬀorts by the World Bank under Wolfensohn to
crack down on corrupt borrowers and better prioritize loans, or eﬀorts by
the IMF to increase transparency and exert (some) pressure on severe
oﬀenders like Zimbabwe.
We are beginning to recognize that opening up to the global capital mar-
ket may have the potential to do either good or harm, depending on the cir-
cumstances. Recommending capital mobility for institutional basket cases
is pointless, the argument goes: with their low productivity levels there isn’t
much to ﬁnance, and essentially there is no positive future growth path
(Easterly 2001; Gourinchas and Jeanne 2003; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004).
Moreover, countries with weak institutions may be more susceptible to
crises (Acemoglu et al. 2003). According to this logic, when it comes to
capital market liberalization, it is the emerging markets we need to focus
on, countries that have taken the ﬁrst step on the escalator of modern eco-
nomic growth and now have improved growth prospects (and lower crisis
risk) that justify the inﬂow of capital. If these arguments hold up, and we
continue to ﬁnd strong eﬀects of institutions on growth and crises, the case
for a more nuanced approach to capital mobility would be bolstered.
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